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This study investigates the possible sources of distortions in an international mixed oligopoly.
We extend the existing linear/quadratic model to a general framework and show that a public
enterprise may either serve as a regulatory device or may itself create an additional level of
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We then extend the basic quantity setting game to incorporate a preplay stage at which firms can
choose the timing of action, rather than moving in an exogenously imposed sequence, in order
to determine endogenously the equilibrium sequence of moves. We argue that the distortions
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can be attributed to an arbitrary and unjustified modeling assumption concerning the order of
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1 Introduction
Privatization that involves the transfer of ownership from government to the private sector entails
changes in the firm’s monitoring and incentive systems as well as changes in the structure of market.
From the theoretical point of view, if markets (including the political market) were competitive
and complete contracts could be written and enforced, ownership structure would not matter (Sap-
pington and Stiglitz, 1987). Models that deal with the eﬀects of ownership on eﬃciency must depart
from one or both of these assumptions. If markets are not competitive but complete contracts are
possible, then the public enterprise can serve perfectly as a policy instrument to pursue social goals
and overcome market failure. If competition prevails but contracts are incomplete, then firms face
principal-agent problems at diﬀerent levels of their organizations which are arguably more severe
in public sector firms. Therefore, in a relatively competitive market due to organizational failure
of government firms, “[as] theoretical analysis and empirical evidence assert, private ownership is
most eﬃcient” (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for a recent survey on
empirical research).
The mixed oligopoly literature that deals with public enterprise behavior in an imperfect market
has concluded that, even in the absence of organizational failure, privatization of a public enterprise
still can be justified (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989). That is because a public enterprise that strives
to correct, or reduce, the detrimental eﬀects of the market imperfection may itself raise an additional
level of distortion. If the market is not highly concentrated, this may outweigh the beneficial eﬀect
of eroding underprovision by the private firms. Pal and White (1998) incorporate international com-
petition into the model and find that, regardless of the degree of competition intensity, it is always
preferable to privatize the domestic public enterprise and use other policy instruments such as pro-
duction subsidies to regulate an imperfect market. This result holds even when the government uses
a complete set of strategic trade policy instruments that matches all possible sources of distortions
apart from public enterprise itself (Sepahvand, 2004).
This observation has far-reaching implications for policy making. The World Bank Policy Re-
search (1995) reports that, despite the declining share of public enterprise investment in recent
decades due to vast privatization programs, public enterprises still play a significant role in the
world economy. This is particularly evident in developing countries. For example, the shares of
public enterprises in China and Vietnam in 2000 were 26% and 48% of their GDPs respectively,
while the latter, which has been trying to open up its market to international competition, is still
reluctant to reduce the share of public enterprises in the industrial sectors of its economy (IMF
Report, 2003). The above findings relating to the distortionary eﬀects of the public enterprises be-
havior in the presence of foreign competition may encourage these countries to revise their position
on government ownership.
In some sectors, such as banking businesses, direct state intervention remains very strong. La
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Porta et.al. (2002) report that in mid-1990s, even after a large wave of privatization, about one
quarter of the assets of the largest banks in developed countries and half of the assets of the largest
banks in the developing countries were still under state control. Also due to the financial liberal-
ization over the last decade in many countries foreign-owned banks have become the main players
in the domestic financial market. For example, over a period of just five years from 1994 to 1999,
among countries of Latin America the share of foreign banks1 increased from 13 percent to 45 per-
cent (Demirguc-Kunt et. al. 2004). If state banks are themselves a source of distortion and that is
expected to be more detrimental in the presence of foreign participants, then further privatization
should be invoked in the banking industry.
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of mixed oligopoly models and the policy relevance of
the results, so far they have not attracted the attention in the theoretical debates over privatization
that the topic merits. This is partly because few have gone beyond simple linear-quadratic models.
More significantly, little attention has been paid to checking the robustness of results with respect
to their basic modelling assumptions.
We extend the basic model applied in the literature from a linear-quadratic case to a fairly gen-
eral framework that accommodates more general forms of demand and cost functions. Furthermore,
we show that only when the public enterprise acts as a Cournot player will it generate a distortion.
But with a first-mover advantage the public enterprise can serve as an eﬀective regulatory device
comparable with a production subsidy. This allows us to suggest an alternative explanation for the
welfare gain of privatization in an international Cournot mixed oligopoly found by earlier studies.
We then consider which of the above models (Cournot or Stackelberg) is consistent with the firms’
preferences and objectives and may lead to a self-enforcing equilibrium. So the quantity-setting game
is extended to a preplay stage where firms can choose their timing of action rather than moving
in an ordered time. We adopt the “extended game with observable delays” suggested by Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) and developed by Amir and Grilo (1999) in order to determine endogenously
the sequence of moves. The result indicates that the natural order of play in an international mixed
oligopoly model with subsidization is not the simultaneous play that characterizes Cournot competi-
tion. However, under some circumstances, including the linear demand model that has widely been
used in the literature, public Stackelberg leadership is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
extended game with endogenous order of moves. This has important implications for debates over
privatization and market distortions as we will discuss shortly.
2 The Framework
Consider a domestic market for a homogeneous product. The rest of the world is labelled as foreign.
While the foreign firms supply their products to the country in question, we assume the domestic
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firms only operate domestically. The number of firms is limited hence both foreign and domestic
private firms enjoy some degree of market power. The trade policy of the home country includes
an import tariﬀ, t, and a production subsidy for domestic firms’ home sales, s. Both are defined as
specific rates i.e. as amounts of money per unit of output. In an international oligopoly without
public enterprise, these policy instruments are enough to correct distortions (Dixit, 1984). Adopting
this setting as a benchmark, we examine if the introduction of a domestic state-owned enterprise
can generate another level of distortion.
The home market is served bym+1 domestic private firms and n foreign private firms. Output of
the i’th domestic private firm is qdi , i = (0, 1, ..,m), and that of the j’th foreign firm is q
f
j ,j = (1, .., n).
Total output isQ =
Pm
i=0 q
d
i+
Pn
j=1 q
f
j . The inverse demand function, p(Q), is decreasing, continuous
and twice-diﬀerentiable, and is derived from a log-concave demand. Thus it satisfies Q.p00 + p0 ≤ 0.
The log-concavity of demand implies the Hahn stability condition and also that the marginal revenue
of each profit-maximizing firm decreases as the output of any other firm increases. We assume firms
share an identical2 technology that can be represented by a convex cost function c = c(qi) where
c(0) = 03. Let πd be the profit of each domestic firm πd = p(Q)qd − cd(qd) + sqd and the profit of
each foreign firm be πf = p(Q)qf − cf (qf )− tqf . The industry revenue cannot increase infinitely as
there is a level of Q¯ for which p(Q¯) = 0. Let g(Q) denote the gross benefits to home consumers i.e.
the area under the inverse demand curve. Thus
g(Q) =
Z Q
p(u)du, g0(Q) = p(Q) (1)
and the home country’s welfare function is given by net consumer surplus plus domestic firms’
surpluses minus the net costs of trade policy:
W = g(Q)− p(Q)Q+ (m+ 1)[p(Q)qd − cd(qd) + sqd]− [(m+ 1)sqd − tnqf ]. (2)
Now consider a two stage game. At the first stage, the government announces the strategic
trade policy instruments. At the second stage, taking the announced subsidy and tariﬀ as given, all
domestic and foreign firms select their outputs to maximize their own profits under Cournot-Nash
assumptions. Cournot equilibrium requires each firm equates its marginal cost and marginal revenue
from the sales. Therefore the equilibrium conditions are
p+ p0qd + s = c0d (3)
p+ p0qf = c0f + t. (4)
Using (3) and (4) to substitute for s and t, the welfare function can be written as
W = g[(m+ 1)qd + nqf ]− np0[(m+ 1)qd + nqf ]qf2 − nc0f (qf )qf − (1 +m)cd(qd). (5)
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The trade policy instruments directly influence firms’ output decisions. The change in home
welfare resulting from a small change in firms’ decisions in equilibrium is
dW = [p+ np00qf2 − c0d](m+ 1)dqd + [p+ qf (np00qf + 2p0 − c00f )− c0f ]ndqf . (6)
The coeﬃcients of (m + 1)dqd and ndqf respectively tell us the welfare eﬀects of altering the
volume of s and t. The government of the domestic country increases (decreases) the rates of
tariﬀ and subsidy if the values of these coeﬃcients are greater (smaller) than zero. Therefore, the
equilibrium solution satisfies the following conditions across all domestic and foreign firms



i) p+ np00qf2 − c0d = 0
ii) p+ qf (np00qf + 2p0 − c00f )− c0f = 0
(7)
We assume that the welfare function is strictly concave in (qd, qf ) or any linear and positive
transformation of it, so the conditions (7i− ii) are necessary and suﬃcient for anallocation to be an
optimum solution for the government’s problem. The policies t and s are implicitly defined by the
above conditions. For a linear example, the optimal subsidy is
s∗ =
θdp
(m+ 1)²
(8)
where θd = Qd/Q is the share of domestic production, Qd, in total supply and ² = −(∂Q/∂p)(p/Q)
is the price elasticity of demand. This implies that the level of optimal subsidy is decreasing in the
number of domestic firms and the elasticity of demand in absolute value. Also the greater is the share
of home production in total output, the higher is the level of the subsidy. It can be checked that
the level of optimal tariﬀ is always positive with a log-concave demand and convex cost functions.
3 International Mixed Oligopoly and Market Distortions
To investigate the eﬀect of public enterprise behavior on market eﬃciency in this section, we will
replace one of the domestic firms by a welfare maximizing public firm in the model and compare the
results.
To begin with, following Fjell and Heywood (2002), Matsumura (2003) and Cornes and Sepa-
hvand (2003), we assume that the public firm has a first-mover advantage. Consider a two stage
game. At an initial stage, the government commits itself to selected rates of s and t while at the
same time it sets the output of the public firm q0 to maximize domestic welfare given by (2). At
the second stage, taking the government’s policy instruments as given, m+ n domestic and foreign
private firms choose their outputs to maximize their own profits. We are led to the following result:
5
Proposition 1: If the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader in an international mixed oligopoly
with strategic trade policy, it adds no distortions to the market.
(See Appendix A for the proof.)
After change in ownership, the zero-th firm follows the same pattern of behavior presented by
(7−i). As the results of the game still support the unique optimum solution where all distortions are
corrected, we may conclude that the presence of a dominant public enterprise adds no distortions to
the market.
Notice that the public enterprise in a linear example always follows marginal cost pricing. How-
ever in general it produces where its marginal cost is greater or equal to the market price4. This is
also the case for the foreign firms, as the term in bracket in (7-ii) is always negative.
The next step is to check the impact of the timing of the public firm’s behavior on market
outcomes. That is because earlier studies in the mixed oligopoly literature that insist on the distor-
tionary eﬀects of the public enterprise behavior typically adopt a diﬀerent modelling assumption,
namely Cournot competition.
Lemma 1: If the public enterprise moves simultaneously with the private firms at the second
stage of the game, then the economy cannot achieve at its optimum.
(See Appendix B for the proof).
Since we have already had the optimum solution under public Stackelberg leadership, any diﬀer-
ence in results implies that the economy is diverging from its optimum. With Cournot competition
the public enterprise adds to market distortions because firms’ output decisions do not satisfy the
optimum conditions. Thus, it is not surprising to observe privatization that returns the model to a
standard oligopoly with strategic trade policy being able to improve welfare of the domestic country
when the public enterprise acts as a Cournot player.
4 Endogenous Order of Moves
In the last section we observed that the existence of a distortionary aﬀect associated with the
presence of a public enterprise depends on the basic modelling assumptions regarding the order of
moves. Most of the economic literature assumes Cournot competition with simultaneous play as
the natural order of play in a quantity-setting game5. Existing analyses typically argue that the
assumed order of play should also be consistent with the players’ preferences over the timing of
actions. As public enterprises are typically non-profit maximizing firms, their preferences are not
the same as private firms. So one cannot simply assume that in a mixed oligopoly firms compete in
Cournot fashion without first justifying this assumption.
We focus now on an international mixed oligopoly in its simplest form where there is just one
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firm of each type; one domestic public firm, one domestic private firm and one foreign private firm.
We assume that the government only uses a production subsidy or we set t = 06. We are interested
in this setting because in earlier studies relating to mixed oligopoly, privatization is justified only if
the public enterprise is operating in a suﬃciently competitive market (De Fraja and Delbono 1989,
Cremer et. al. (1989). By contrast, in an international mixed Cournot oligopoly with subsidization,
privatization always improves welfare regardless of the intensity of competition. However, this result
is sensitive to the timing assumption (Sepahvand, 2004).
Corollary 1: The results of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 hold if the tariﬀ is equal to zero.
However, in this event the equilibrium solution diﬀers and satisfies the following conditions7:



i) p+ p0(1 + ∂q
f
∂qd )q
f − c0d = 0
ii) p+ p0qf − c0f = 0
(9)
where the optimal subsidy is
s∗ = −p0[Qd/2 + (1 + ∂q
f
∂qd
)qf ]. (10)
The SNP equilibrium level of subsidy is always positive since with a log-concave demand the slope
of all profit-maximizing firm’s best response function, BR, always belongs to [−1, 0] (Vives,1999).
Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), let us extend the basic quantity-setting game of an
international mixed oligopoly with subsidization to a preplay stage where firms choose their timing
of action rather than moving in an exogenously imposed order. This hypergame is denoted by
Γ(.) and it consists of two stages: a preplay stage and a basic stage. In the preplay stage, firms
simultaneously decide whether to choose actions in the basic game at the first opportunity and move
early, denoted by E, or to wait until observing their rival’s action and move late, denoted by L.
So the set of action times is T = (E,L) and a combination of timing decisions is ψ ≡ (τ0, τp, τf )
where τ i ∈ T and the subscripts i ∈ {0, p, f} where 0, p and f stand for domestic public enterprise,
domestic private firm and foreign firm respectively. The set of all possible timings is Ψ8.
In the basic stage, there are two phases: the regulation phase and the action phase (Figure 1).
In the regulation phase, after the announcement, the government of the host country observes the
announced timing of the game and chooses the subsidy from a non-negative finite subset of real
numbers B in advance of the firms’ moves. Then in the action phase of the basic stage, firms select
their outputs knowing when the others will make their choices and the announced level of subsidy
associated with each order of moves. For example, the output choice of the domestic public firm
when it moves simultaneously with other firms at the early stage of action phase is q
(EEE)
0 (s)
9. The
strategy of each firm is Si = (τ i, q
ψ
i (s)) and the strategy profile is S = ΠSi.
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The government 
ob serves the 
announced 
timing of actions, 
ψ , and sets s. 
Firms announced 
moving early, 
observe ψ and s 
and choose qi. 
Firms simultaneously  
choose their time of  
action τi   and 
announce them as  
commitments.   
Firms announced 
moving  late   observe  ψ and s   a n d   q i   a n d   
choose  q j .   
time   
Basic Stage Preplay Stage   
Figure 1: The extended game
We do not need to consider all possible strategies of firms at the basic game in order to solve the
game, because Nash equilibrium in subgames eliminates non-equilibrium output choices. Therefore,
we can confine ourselves to Nash equilibria in subgames denoted by eψ. All payoﬀs in subgames’
Nash equilibria are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: The reduced strategic form of the game in an international mixed triopoly model
I)Public firm moves early (E)
Foreign Firm
Early Late
Domestic
Private
Firm
E (W (EEE),πd(EEE)p ,πf(EEE)) (W (EEL),πp(EEL),πf(EEL))
L (W (ELE),πp(ELE),πf(ELE)) (W (ELL),πp(ELL),πf(ELL))
II) Public firm moves late (L)
Foreign Firm
Early Late
Domestic
Private
Firm
E (W (LEE),πp(LEE),πf(LEE)) (W (LEL),πp(LEL),πf(LEL))
L (W (LLE),πp(LLE),πf(LLE)) (W (LLL),πp(LLL),πf(LLL))
The timing choice of firms can be obtained by comparing the payoﬀs of each timing choice with
the payoﬀs of any feasible timing of play at that subgame. Three possibilities arise: 1) only one of
the sequential outcomes Pareto dominates the simultaneous move outcome and it will be the unique
equilibrium of the extended game, 2) both sequential outcomes Pareto dominate the simultaneous
move outcome, 3) neither of the sequential outcomes Pareto dominates the simultaneous moves. The
possibility of the simultaneous play, which is the basic assumption of Cournot competition, arises
only in the third case.
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Corollary 1 ensures that a simultaneous play with all firms moving late, e(LLL), cannot be an SPN
equilibrium of the extended game. However we may still have a simultaneous play as an equilibrium
if all firms choose to move early, e(EEE). But we will show in the next lemma and proposition that
the foreign firm has an incentive to deviate from this setting.
Lemma 2) In the extended game Γ(.), if the foreign firm chooses moving late and the public firm
chooses moving early, the equilibrium level of the home industry output is unchanged regardless of
the domestic private firm’s choice of action time.
Proof. If qdp is the equilibrium output level of the domestic private firm at e
(EEL), it should
solve
dπp
dqdp
= p0(1 + ∂qf/∂qd)qdp + p− c0d + s = 0. (11)
In the regulatory phase of the basic game the public enterprise maximizes welfare with respect to
qd0 , while taking the BRf and the level of the subsidy and q
d
p as given. So its behavior still supports
(9i− ii). As there exists a positive subsidy that supports the optimum,
s∗(EEL) = −p0(1 + ∂qf/∂qd)(qdp + qf ), (12)
we may conclude that the SPN equilibrium level of the home industry output in both settings is the
same because of the uniqueness of the optimum along the BRf . Therefore, Q
d(EEL) = Qd(ELL).
Lemma 2 simply says that if the foreign firm plans to move late and the public firm chooses to
move early, any change in the timing of action by the domestic private firm just changes the level
of the subsidy. But the SPN equilibrium level of the home industry output and the share of each
domestic firm in the total home industry output remains unchanged. The following proposition
summarizes our findings about the simultaneous order of moves.
Proposition 2) In an extended game Γ(.), the simultaneous order of moves is not a SNP
equilibrium outcome.
Proof. The simultaneous order of moves where all firms choose moving late is not an SPN
equilibrium of the extended game because of Corollary 1. As Lemma 2 shows Qd(EEL) = Qd(ELL).
But from Corollary 1 we also know that Qd(EEE) > Qd(ELL). Recall πf is decreasing in Qd. This
ensures us that the foreign firm always prefers moving late rather than moving simultaneously with
domestic firms. Hence the simultaneous order of moves in the first period, e(EEE), cannot be the
SPN equilibrium outcome of the extended game too.
So far, we have shown that simultaneous play is not the SPN equilibrium of the extended game.
Now we want to evaluate an alternative assumption about the order of moves, namely public firm
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leadership. The feasible alternatives for the firms in this setting are e(LLL), e(EEL) and e(ELE) (see
Table 1). The domestic public enterprise who seeks to maximize domestic welfare prefers e(ELL) to
e(LLL) setting due to Proposition 2. The following lemma shows that from the domestic private
firm’s point of views public firm leadership is always preferable to e(EEL), so the domestic private
firm has also no incentive to deviate from that setting.
Lemma 3) If the public firm moves first and the foreign firm moves later, the payoﬀ of the
domestic private firm is always higher when it chooses moving late.
Proof. A comparison of (12) and (10) shows that
s∗(ELL) − s∗(EEL) = p0qdp(∂qf/∂qd) ≥ 0 (13)
since ∂qf/∂qd ∈ [−1, 0] when demand function is log-concave and p0 < 0 everywhere. Therefore,
while the domestic private firm produces the same level of output, it will receive a greater subsidy
when it chooses to move late.
The payoﬀ of the foreign firm after deviation from e(ELL) depends on the eﬀects of such a change
on the home industry output. So we need to look at the timing of the foreign firm’s action and its
eﬀects on the home industry.
First let us identify the set of feasible output plans in two settings, e(ELE) and e(ELL). In e(ELL),
it seems that the set of feasible output plans does not depend on the subsidy. Let V denote the set
of all points along the BRf for any given level of the public enterprise output. The set of feasible
output plans, the set of all points in (Qd(s), qf ) space that the home government can choose from
by setting various level of subsidies, still equals V.
Let U denote the set of all feasible output plans in e(ELE) for any given level of qd0 . Any element
of this set depicts a point along the BRp that maximizes the foreign firm’s profit for a given level of
subsidy. Note that both BRp and BRf are downward sloping and a foreign firm’s iso-profit contours
touch the BRp curves at the downward sloping part of the contours. A change in the level of subsidy
shifts the BRp. As the downward sloping part of the foreign firm’s iso-profit contours are above the
V, thus U is located inevitably above the V for any given level of the home industry output in the
(Qd, qf ) space.
Figure 2 illustrates three possible points of U in the two-dimension space for a given level of qd0 .
BRpis tangent to the foreign firm iso-profit contour at point A if the level of subsidy is s1. The
government can choose points B or C if it sets the level of subsidy at s2 or s3. Therefore U is
the locus of tangencies traced out as the subsidy varies. One can expand the above analysis into
a three-dimension space to include the public enterprise output choices. However, that would not
aﬀect our findings10.
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qf
Qd(s)q0
BRf
BRp(s1)
BRp(s3)
BRp(s2)
Figure 2: Three elements of U for diﬀerent levels of subsidy.
The following lemma shows suﬃcient conditions for the home country preferences that guarantee
an increase in the home industry output when the foreign firm deviates from e(ELL).
Lemma 4) If the demand function is concave and p0 − p00qf − C 00d < 011, then Qd(ELE) ≥
Qd(ELL).
(See Appendix C for the proof)
Lemma 4 guarantees that the solution of e(ELE) is located to the northeast of the e(ELL) . This
implies that the foreign firm faces a higher level of home industry output and hence a reduction in
its profit due to deviation from e(ELL) .
We can now establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3) In the extended game Γ(.), if the conditions of lemma 4 hold, then public Stack-
elberg leadership is the SPN equilibrium solution of the game.
Proof. First, the public enterprise cannot be better oﬀ if it chooses to move late instead of
moving early at e(ELL) since W (ELL) > W (LLL) (Corollary 1). Second, the domestic private firm
will not change its timing choice in e(ELL) as this results in a reduction in the level of optimal subsidy
but leaving its SPN equilibrium output unchanged (Lemma 3). Third, if the foreign firm were to
deviate from e(ELL) and the lemma 4 conditions were hold, the home industry would produce more.
But πf is decreasing in Qd. So the foreign firm will also be worse oﬀ by deviating from e(ELL) . As
no firm has an incentive to deviate from the order of moves under public Stackelberg leadership,
e(ELL) is the only SPN equilibrium of the extended game.
Proposition 3 asserts that public Stackelberg leadership Pareto dominates the simultaneous play
and the other feasible alternatives. Accordingly, it is the only SPN equilibrium of the extended game
with observable delays. Nevertheless, in general we may have other SPN equilibrium solutions with
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diﬀerent orders of play.
The majority of papers that deal with the welfare eﬀects of public enterprise behavior in mixed
oligopoly use a linear demand model. As the linear demand model satisfies the Lemma 4’s conditions,
we may legitimately apply the above results.
Example 1 Suppose the inverse demand function is given by p = 10 − Q and the firms share
an identical cost function represented by c(q) = 1/2q2. Table 2 shows the Nash equilibria in the
subsequent subgames in this simple example.
Table 2: International mixed triopoly: a numerical example
I)Public firm moves early (E)
Foreign Firm
Early Late
Domestic
Private
Firm
E [ 33.96 15.4 1.92 ] [ 34 11.95 2.16 ]
L [ 34.16 14.39 2.03 ] [ 34 15.36 2.16 ]
II) Public firm moves late (L)
Foreign Firm
Early Late
Domestic
Private
Firm
E [ 33.96 10.29 1.92 ] [ 33.96 8.6 1.92 ]
L [ 34.06 15.25 1.92 ] [ 33.96 15.4 1.92 ]
The above payoﬀ matrix reveals that the public Stackelberg leadership is the SPN equilibrium
of the extended game in the linear example. A comparison of the payoﬀs shows that no player in
the e(ELL) setting can unilaterally change its timing of action in a way that improves its payoﬀ.
5 Conclusion and Remarks
There are two distinct sources of market distortion in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competition.
Market distortions in the domestic economy arise partly because of oligopolistic nature of the com-
petition within the domestic industry, and partly because of the market power of the foreign firms;
they can set price above marginal costs and transfer the profits of the industry abroad.
It is well known from the theory of trade that in an imperfect market of an open domestic
economy, the optimum trade policy calls for a combination of subsidies and tariﬀs to address each
type of distortion directly. Some studies argue that the presence of a public enterprise in the domestic
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market raises a new source of distortion that cannot be corrected by a full set of strategic trade
policy instruments. It follows then that privatization can enhance welfare in the domestic country
even if it does not improve internal (organizational) eﬃciency.
This paper shows that this argument is valid only if the public enterprise acts as a Cournot
player and moves simultaneously with private firms in a quantity-setting game. But if it sets its
outputs in advance of the private firms and acts as a Stackelberg leader the operation of a public
enterprise is comparable to a production subsidy deployed to correct distortions within the home
industry. Moreover the public enterprise produces where the market price is greater or equal to its
marginal cost.
The application of the extended game with observable delay to endogenize the order of moves
shows that the assumption of simultaneous quantity choice by public and private firms does not
lead to a self-enforcing equilibrium. This result raises a serious question about those works in
the existing literature that condition their models upon the Cournot assumption without justifying
this assumption. Second, under some circumstances, including a linear demand model, the public
Stackelberg leadership is the unique SPN equilibrium of the extended game of mixed oligopoly
with subsidization1. The intuition behind our results is simple. If, following the founders of mixed
oligopoly models, we consider the public enterprise as an instrument to regulate an industry from
inside, then we should recall that “the necessary assumption is that the government can credibly
commit to its policy choice before the firms make their choices... [this is] reflected by the assumption
that the government moves first in the game tree ” (Brander, 1995).
Thus in conclusion this paper shows that the distortions raised by the presence of a public
enterprise in international mixed Cournot oligopoly with subsidization can not be attributed to the
firm’s ownership but rather it can be fully explained by an unjustified assumption about the timing
of the game.
Notes
1Those banks that are at least 50 percent foreign.
2It is very diﬃcult to trace the sources of distortions with the heterogeneous cost structure across
the firms. This unrealistic assumption helps us to abstract from organizational eﬃciency and also
makes our results comparable with the existing literature.
3One can assume c(0) 6= 0 to endogenize the number of firms. However, as the number of firms
in our model is fixed and we are not dealing with entry/exit problem for expositional simplicity, we
assume there is no sunk cost in this model.
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4Fjell and Pal (1996) state that the public enterprise follows marginal cost only if the number
of foreign firms is zero. This sounds like n = 0 is a necessary condition for marginal cost pricing
while they use a linear demand model. The advantage of our general framework is that it reveals
the limits of their analysis.
5That is because without establishing a mechanism that provides a precommitment for the leader
(and only for the leader) to a certain strategy, the only credible precommitment for the profit-
maximizing firms is a simultaneous play strategy (Wolfstetter, 1999, p. 79 ).
6Now the model is exactly the same as the model used in Pal and White (1998, Section 3) but
here in a generalized form.
7We omit the proof here as it has been given elsewhere.
8Note that the set Ψ has 8 elements as there are 8 possible ways to put 3 elements into 2 cells.
9Formally, here the set of one firm’s, say domestic public firm’s, strategies is So = T ×Φo where
Φo is the set of functions that maps the information set of the public firm into the action set of
public firm, Ao. Here the information set of the public firm is {{(EEE), (EEL), (ELL),
(LLL), (LEE) × Ap × Af , (LLE) × Af , (LEL) × Ap} × B} where Ap and Af are the action
spaces of domestic private firm and the foreign firm respectively. The set of strategies profile is
S = So × Sp × Sf .
10Then set U is a plane that still for any given value of qd0 is located above V that is also a plane
with decreasing slope in both qdp and q
d
0 in R
3
+ space.
11Capital C represents the cost function of home industry. It can be defined as C(Qd) =
Min{c(qdp) + c(qdo), Qd = qdp + qdo}.
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• Appendix
A- The equilibrium conditions at the second stage of the game for all domestic firms except the
zero-th firm is presented in (3). A small change of welfare in equilibrium with a dominant welfare
maximizing public enterprise is
dW = [p
∂Q
∂q0
+ np00qf2
∂Q
∂q0
+ 2np0qf
∂qf
∂q0
− ncf 00qf ∂q
f
∂q0
− ncf 0 ∂q
f
∂q0
−mcd0p
∂qdp
∂q0
− c0o]dq0
+ [p+ np00qf2 − cd0p ]mdqdp + [p+ qf (np00qf + 2p0 − cf 00)− cf 0]ndqf (A-1)
where subscribe p distinct the domestic private firms from the zero-th or public firm. As ∂Q∂q0 =
1 +m
∂qdp
∂q0 + n
∂qf
∂q0 , (A-1) can be rearranged as
dW = [p+ np00qf2 − c0o]dq0 + [p+ np00qf2 − c0dp ]m
∂qdp
∂q0
dq0
+[p+ qf (np00qf + 2p0 − c00f )− c0f ]n∂q
f
∂q0
dq0 + [p+ np
00qf2 − c0dp ]mdqdp (A-2)
+[p+ qf (np00qf + 2p0 − c00f )− c0f ]ndqf .
At equilibrium where the government makes a proper use of its policy instruments in order to
induce firms to produce the desired level of outputs, the firms output levels satisfy the following
conditions,



i) p+ np00qf2 − c0d0 = 0
ii) p+ np00qf2 − c0dp = 0
iii) p+ qf (np00qf + 2p0 − c00f )− c0f = 0
(A-3)
which are exactly the same as equilibrium conditions at optimum presented in (7 i− ii).
B- In Cournot competition the public enterprise sets qd0 at the second stage of the game to
maximize welfare. So the equilibrium at the second stage is characterized by (3) and (4) and also
p− np0qf = c0d0 . (B-1)
Define −p0qf from (B-1) and insert it in (4). Then evaluate it for t and plug the result in (2) to
get
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W = g(Q) + pqf − c0d0 − c0d0 qf −mcdp − nc0fqf . (B-1)
Following the same logic as Appendix A, the equilibrium solution for the firms’ outputs is required
to satisfy these conditions,



i)p− np0qf − c0d0 = 0
ii) p+ p0qf −mc0dp = 0
iii) 2p+ qf (p0 − nc00f )− nc0f − c0d0 = 0
(B-2)
that diﬀer from (7 i− ii) the conditions of optimum solution.
C- Let Z ≡ {(Qd, qf ) ∈ R2|Qd ∈ argMaxW (Qd, qf )} denote all the points where for any given
level of imports the domestic welfare is maximized. If the graph of Z is upward sloping then the
iso-welfare contours at the far distance from origin in northeast direction are associated with a higher
level of welfare. The slope of Z is equal to
−(∂
2W/∂qd∂qf
∂2W/∂2qd
) = − −p
00qf
p0 − p00qf − C00d .
which is positive if the demand function is concave and p0 − p00qf − C 00d < 0. As the graph of U is
decreasing in home industry output and it is located above V, the upper iso-welfare curves touch it at
the northeast of the public Stackelberg leadership solution. This implies that Qd(ELE) ≥ Qd(ELL).
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